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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred by Section 
78-2(a}-3(2)(i), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the lower court err in its determination that 
approximately $148,000 of promissory notes executed by the 
defendant to various third parties constituted marital property 
subject to division even though the funds for such loans came 
from an account the court determined to be separate and even 
though all of the notes were executed after the parties had been 
legally divorced? The appellate standard of review for this 
issue is whether the lower court's Findings of Fact are contrary 
to the clear preponderance of the evidence or that the trial 
court has abused its discretion in making the award. An 
appellate court will disturb a trial court's findings if the 
appellate court reaches the definite and firm conviction that 
mistakes have been made, Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 
1990)• It is incumbent upon a trial court to first divide 
separate property from marital property before making any 
division of assets. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 
1990); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Did the lower court err in failing to allow the full 
value of a debt Defendant incurred in his business operation to 
be deducted from the division of marital assets? Specifically, 
did the court err in concluding in its Findings that Defendant 
was indebted to his mother for only $270,000 rather than 
$410,000 as shown by the undisputed evidence. The standard of 
appellate review for this issue is whether the lower court's 
Findings of Fact are contrary to the clear preponderance of the 
evidence or that the trial court has abused its discretion in 
making the award. An appellate court will disturb a trial 
court's findings if the appellate court reaches the definite and 
firm conviction that mistakes have been made. Berger v. Berber, 
713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
App. 1990); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 
1988). 
3. Did the lower court err in finding that $57,000 would 
be included as an asset of Defendant in the marital division 
even though the court acknowledged that such award was 
completely arbitrary and was not based upon any evidence as to 
the actual amount that Defendant received in a real estate 
transaction. The appellate standard of review for this issue is 
-2-
whether the lower court's Findings of Fact are contrary to the 
clear preponderance of the evidence or that the trial court has 
abused its discretion in making the award. An appellate court 
will disturb a trial court's findings if the appellate court 
reaches the definite and firm conviction that mistakes have been 
made. Dunn v. Dunnf 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). 
4. Does the Decree of Divorce fail to properly credit 
Defendant for $4,300 awarded by the Court to Defendant as value 
for a boat which Plaintiff converted from the marital assets? 
The appellate standard of review for this issue is whether the 
lower court's Findings of Fact are contrary to the clear 
preponderance of the evidence or that the trial court has abused 
its discretion in making the award. An appellate court will 
disturb a trial court's findings if the appellate court reaches 
the definite and firm conviction that mistakes have been made. 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. Disposition of Property. 
1. When a Decree of Divorce is entered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations and 
parties. 
* * * 
3. The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and 
necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Supplemental Judgment of Divorce 
entered by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. The sole issue of 
this appeal is whether the lower court erred in making its award 
of property to the respective parties, 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In December of 1990, Plaintiff filed her Complaint for 
Divorce, (R. 6). On February 26, 1991 a Decree of Divorce was 
entered as to the marriage of the parties. All remaining issues 
were reserved for further consideration by the court. (R. 
82-85). 
A trial was held before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on 
June 4, 11, 12, 15 and 16 of 1992. Judge Wilkinson ruled from 
the bench as to the various matters being contested by the 
parties. (R. 484-517). 
Subsequently, on August 4, 1992 the Court signed and 
executed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce prepared by Plaintiff's 
counsel. (R. 362-94; 395-403). 
On September 1, 1992 Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal. 
(R. 429). On September 14, 1992 Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Cross Appeal. (R. 430). 
On November 4, 1992 this Court on its own motion 
consolidated the two appeals into Case No. 920588-CA. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The litigation in the lower court was extensive and 
required approximately five days of trial. Numerous issues 
concerning the custody and visitation of children, alimony, 
distribution of assets, and requests for contempt, were 
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litigated below. The complexity of this divorce proceeding is 
best illustrated by the over thirty-page Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which were required to be entered as to the 
numerous issues being litigated. 
Fortunately, however, for purposes of Defendant's appeal 
only several issues of controversy now remain. All of these 
areas focus upon the award of property and assets by the lower 
court. While Defendant does not necessarily agree with the 
Court's decision concerning other matters, Defendant realizes 
that the lower court is vested with a large amount of discretion 
and that such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in most 
instances. On the other hand, those matters which are now being 
raised on this appeal by Defendant concern errors of property 
division where mistakes or inconsistency have occurred. With 
this in mind, therefore, the Statement of Facts will be utilized 
only to give this Court a thumbnail sketch of the present 
controversy on appeal. The actual "marshalling of the evidence" 
will be deferred to the individual sections of argument 
contained infra in this brief. See Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 
836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). 
The parties were married on August 26, 1978 in Virginia. 
During the course of the marriage the parties had three 
children, two boys and a girl, ranging in present age from 13 to 
7. During the marriage Plaintiff maintained the household and 
the children while Defendant participated in various business 
ventures including real estate sales and development. The 
income made by the defendant from these ventures paid a large 
portion of the family expenses each year. 
In addition, however, Defendant had inherited a substantial 
amount of blue chip stock from his grandparents. A plan going 
back several generations had been devised for tax purposes 
whereas the family inheritance would be passed on by skipping 
one generation. Thus, Defendant received his inheritance from 
his grandparents whereas Defendant's children were to receive 
their inheritance from Defendant's parents. 
Prior to the inception of the marriage Defendant maintained 
an account at Kidder-Peabody in which the inherited stock was 
placed. The value of the stock appreciated on its own through 
the years of the marriage. In addition, in 1986 over $260,000 
of stock was placed into the Kidder-Peabody account when a 
personal holding company opened by Defendant's grandfather 
required liquidation. It was undisputed that all of this stock 
and the account itself was solely in the name of the defendant 
Peter Coats. 
During the course of the marriage Defendant utilized this 
account in several ways. On some occasions he would directly 
draw money out of the account specifically for family expenses 
such as homes, cars, and other necessities. He frequently used 
the dividend income from the account to supplement the extensive 
lifestyle enjoyed by the parties. He also frequently margined 
the account so that he could borrow funds for his real estate 
ventures. 
After the marriage had been officially terminated by the 
lower court, Defendant found that he could significantly 
increase his real estate commissions if he would lend home 
owners amounts of money to allow them to purchase new 
homes pending the sale of their old home. Accordingly, after 
the divorce was finalized he lent approximately $148,000 drawn 
from the Kidder-Peabody margin account to a number of third 
parties and received trust notes in return. A more complete 
discussion concerning the Kidder-Peabody account will be made 
during the Argument portion of this brief. 
During the course of the marriage the parties acquired 
numerous assets in the form of real estate, personal property, 
and receivables. At the same time, however, numerous 
liabilities were also incurred in the form of loans, mortgages, 
and credit consumption. In order for the defendant, for 
example, to develop the Brandon Canyon properties, it was 
necessary for him to borrow approximately $400,000 from his 
mother, Isabel Coats. A complete discussion as to this 
transaction and the ruling of the lower court will also be 
contained infra in the Argument portion of this brief. 
The Brandon Canyon development was principally undertaken 
by the defendant because he was unable to sell several of the 
lots which he had purchased. A great deal of testimony was 
heard by the lower court concerning the profitability of this 
development. The ruling of the lower court in its ultimate 
evaluation of this property as an asset will also be discussed 
in the Argument portion of this brief. 
At the conclusion of the trial the lower court made 
numerous awards and divisions. Essentially, the custody of the 
children was given to the plaintiff subject to specific 
visitation rights of the defendant. The valuation of child 
support and alimony was dependent upon the determination as to 
the defendant's annual income. Because of the complexities of 
the business income as well as the use of assets in order to 
maintain high lifestyle (which all parties agreed was beyond 
their means), a heated controversy was present during the trial 
as to this income determination. The defendant maintained his 
actual average income would be in the $60,000 to $70,000 range, 
whereas the plaintiff maintained that the income level was well 
over $130,000. The lower court adopted the majority of 
Plaintiff's position and ruled that Defendant would be charged 
with an annual income of $120,000 for purposes of determining 
child support and alimony. Accordingly, the Court ordered 
Defendant to pay approximately $2,000 per month as child support 
and $2,000 a month as alimony for a ten-year period. 
The Court was still faced with the monumental task of 
dividing the assets and liabilities of the parties. The Court 
determined, for example, that the Kidder-Peabody account would 
be considered to be the sole property of the defendant. On the 
other hand, specific draws of principle which had been used for 
family purposes such as houses and cars were deemed to be 
marital assets. The Court evaluated numerous items of personal 
property, real estate, and other assets and obligations and 
concluded that the defendant owed Plaintiff approximately 
$144,000 in order to equalize a division of the marital estate. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The issue as to the status of the Kidder-Peabody 
account was highly controversial. Plaintiff attempted to show 
that this account was part of the marital assets even though it 
had been funded entirely from inheritance solely in the name of 
the defendant. Defendant, on the other hand, claimed that this 
account was solely his except for those assets where he had 
removed money from the account and converted them into clearly 
marital assets. The lower court found in favor of the defendant 
and ruled that the Kidder-Peabody account should not be 
considered part of the marital estate. At the same time, 
however, the court ruled that approximately $1485,000 worth of 
notes were a marital asset to be charged against the account of 
the defendant. These notes were all executed after the parties 
had been divorced, were made by the defendant for business 
purposes to generate commission income, were all taken from the 
Kidder-Peabody account, and all notes required payment directly 
back into such account. Thus, had Defendant allowed this money 
to stay in the Kidder-Peabody account it would not have been 
charged as a marital asset against him. The wrongful inclusion 
of these notes resulted to Defendant's detriment of some $58,000 
in the marital balancing equities. 
2. The lower court recognized that Defendant was forced to 
borrow money from his mother in order to have sufficient funds 
to develop Brandon Canyon. This development was considered a 
marital asset by the Court and Defendant was credited with its 
value. The lower court, however, while recognizing a legitimate 
debt existed to Defendant's mother, awarded him only a liability 
of $270,000 even though the undisputed evidence shows that the 
principal balance actually owing as of the time of the 
accounting cutoff was approximately $400,000 with another 
$10,000 in accrued interest. The lower court declined to 
recognize this increased amount on the erroneous assumption that 
a contradiction of testimony had occurred between Defendant's 
mother and Defendant's accountants when no such contradiction in 
fact existed. 
3, One of the other contested items of the trial was the 
value of the Brandon Canyon development. Defendant basically 
claimed that the development was a severe loss and that if 
anything he had lost money because of it. Plaintiff, on the 
other hand, claimed that the development was a success and that 
Defendant should be credited with the development as an asset. 
Ultimately, Defendant (assuming that he would be able to claim 
the liabilities on Brandon Canyon) testified that its asset 
value would be approximately $320,000. The Court adopted 
Defendant's evaluation of Brandon Canyon. However, the court 
also awarded an addition $57,300 against the defendant as an 
arbitrary figure amounting to one-third of the value of the Lot 
16 home which had been sold between the time of the last 
accounting and the time of the court decision. This decision 
admitted by the court to be arbitrary failed to allow Defendant 
to show any additional liability that was incurred during this 
same time period in order to complete the construction of the 
house. Thus, the decision of the court as to this additional 
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$57,300 was not based upon any reliable evidence in the record 
and must either be vacated or remanded for a correct valuation 
to be made. 
4. After extensive testimony concerning the value of a 
jointly-owned boat, the lower court concluded that the boat had 
a value of $4,300 which should be attributed to the plaintiff as 
an asset since she obtained the funds from the boat when she 
sold it during the marriage. In spite of the Court's finding 
and order, the plaintiff was never assessed with this $4,300 
asset and therefore the overall award seeking to equalize the 
marital estate is an error. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant in this action recognizes the standard of 
appellate review which is applicabe to appeals involving divorce 
decrees. This Court in Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 
1990) summarized the various standards of review as follows: 
In a divorce proceeding, "determining and 
assigning values to marital property is a matter for 
the trial court and this Court will not disturb those 
determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of 
discretion. To permit appellate review of the 
property distribution, the distribution must be based 
upon adequate factual findings and must be in 
accordance with the standards set by this state's 
appellate courts. We will not disturb a trial 
court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous, 
that is, against the clear weight of evidence, or 
unless we reach a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. Id. at 1317. (Citations 
omitted). 
As noted earlier, the issues in this divorce were hotly 
contested by both parties. A review of the trial testimony and 
the exhibits reveal numerous instances of dispute and 
disagreement. Both parties extensively utilized accountants in 
attempting to persuade the court that their method of evaluation 
was correct. Numerous experts testified for both sides as to 
the value of property, assets, or even liabilities. Defendant 
readily admits that this was not an easy case for either the 
attorneys, the parties, or the court. 
Because the lower court necessarily had to exercise its 
discretion in many instances, both parties were necessarily 
unhappy about some rulings, and pleased with others. For 
example, Plaintiff won a complete victory in the determination 
by the lower court of Defendant's average income in setting the 
amount of child support and alimony. On the other hand, 
Defendant won several victories in the valuation of personal 
property and in the court's denial of certain obligations that 
Plaintiff was seeking Defendant to pay. 
Defendant believes that this appeal, therefore, does not 
center upon matters of discretion in which the court had 
latitude to decide in either direction. Instead, this appeal 
focuses upon the methods utilized by the court in making its 
awards after the discretionary decisions had already been made. 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT APPROXIMATELY $148,000 IN TRUST 
DEED NOTES WERE PART OF THE MARITAL 
ESTATE SUBJECT TO DIVISION WHEN SUCH 
NOTES CAME FROM NON-MARITAL FUNDS OF THE 
KIDDER-PEABODY ACCOUNT, WERE ALL ISSUED 
AFTER THE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED, AND WERE 
ALL PAYABLE BACK INTO THE KIDDER-
PEABODY FUND. 
As noted earlier in this brief, the status of Defendant's 
Kidder-Peabody account was a highly disputed issue. It was 
undisputed, however, that this account existed prior to the 
marriage, that it was listed solely in Defendant's own name, and 
that all of the stock funding such account had been obtained 
through inheritance from Defendant's grandparents. For example, 
Plaintiff testified as follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Larew): Peter received gifts from his parents 
and grandparents during your marriage; is that 
right? 
A. We all did. 
Q. Was any stock put in your name from Peter's parents? 
A. No. 
Q. Was stock put in Peter's name from his parents? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What about from his grandparents? Did they put stock 
in Peter's name? 
A. I apologize. This stock came from Peter's 
grandparents, not his parents. 
Q. Which stock are you referring to? Is that all the 
stock Peter received? 
A. That's how their family has it set up, yes. 
Q. All stock that Peter got during your marriage was 
from Peter's grandparents? 
A. Generally, yes. (Tr. 805). 
Extensive testimony was offered as to those matters which 
were contested. For example, Plaintiff's accountant testified 
that the Kidder-Peabody account was used on a daily basis by the 
defendant and could not be considered a separate asset of the 
defendant. (Tr. 560-63; 1547-49). Plaintiff testified that 
Defendant always represented during the marriage that the money 
from the Kidder-Peabody accounts always belonged to both of 
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them. (Tr. 759-62). 
On the other hand, Defendant testified that this account 
was solely his property obtained from his grandparents and that 
his wife never had access to either the underlying stock or to 
the account itself. (Tr. 906-11). Defendant acknowledged that 
whenever he utilized assets from the account for non-business 
expenses that that money then became a marital asset. He 
recognized, for example, that $30,000 from the account was used 
for the purchase of a home in Colorado, $58,000 for the purchase 
of the Pepperwood home as well as additional amounts to buy 
automobiles and other family purposes. (Tr. 854-56). 
The question of whether the Kidder-Peabody account would be 
considered marital property or separate property required 
Plaintiff to submit proposals based upon both alternatives. For 
example, Exhibit 90 is a proposed marital asset division 
including the asset of $411,000 for the Kidder-Peabody 
securities as well as a liability of $228,000 owing to the 
Kidder-Peabody margin account. Exhibit 91 was prepared by 
Plaintiff to show the "Marital Asset Division Without 
Kidder-Peabody." See also Plaintiff's Exhibits 97 and 98 for 
a similar treatment of assets and liabilities. 
In making its decision, the lower court attempted to follow 
the directions of this Court when this Court stated: 
[T]he Court should first properly categorize the 
parties1 property as part of the marital estate or as 
the separate property of one or the other. Each 
party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and 50 percent of the marital 
property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P. 2d 1166, 1172 
(Utah App. 1990); Dunn v. Dunnr 802 P.2d 1314, 
1323 (Utah App. 1990). 
-14-
The Court ruled that the Kidder-Peabody account could not 
be considered marital property. In the bench ruling the Court 
stated: 
Now the Court recognizes that there is the 
Kidder-Peabody stock which the defendant—the 
defendant drew on during their marriage. It may have 
been part—I'm sure it was part of it—and the Court 
does find, however, that the corpus of that stock is 
the defendant's, and would remain with the defendant, 
and the liabilities attached to is, and that the 
plaintiff would have no right on that; but that was 
certainly used throughout the marriage, the Court 
would find, as far as generating income, as far as 
what the defendant used with his time to promote the 
various subdivisions or sale of real estate which he 
did generate. (Tr. 509). 
In addition, the Court chose to base its award upon Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 91 which was the marital assets division proposed by the 
plaintiff "without Kidder-Peabody". (Tr. 494). 
The decision of the lower court is fully supportable based 
upon the fact that the Kidder-Peabody account was both 
premarital property and was funded entirely by inheritance 
directly to the defendant. See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 
760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 
(Utah App. 1990); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 
1990); Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 
1990) . 
Thus, under the Court's ruling any stock or other asset 
maintained in the Kidder-Peabody account at the time the divorce 
was final in February of 1991 would properly be considered the 
separate property of the defendant. Plaintiff may not agree 
with the ruling of the Court but can certainly not disagree with 
its elementary concept. 
The problem facing this Court on appeal is simply that the 
lower court, while recognizing that the Kidder-Peabody account 
was separate property, failed to afford the same status to other 
assets which were converted from the Kidder-Peabody account. As 
a result of this error approximately $148,000 of receivable 
notes were included in the marital division with Defendant being 
charged with possession of the assets. 
During the last portion of the marriage Defendant utilized 
the Kidder-Peabody account for the purpose of making what he 
termed as "bridge loans". For example, if a client had found a 
home that they wished to purchase but could not purchase a new 
home until they sold their old home, then Defendant would 
utilize the bridge loan concept. He would take a trust deed 
note on the old home for the amount of equity existing thereby 
enabling the client to purchase the new home. When the old home 
sold, he would then be repaid immediately. This method of using 
the margin ability of the Kidder-Peabody account allowed him to 
often make two commissions from the purchase of the new home and 
the sale of the old home. (Tr. 914-15). During the marriage, 
while most of the money was returned to the Kidder-Peabody 
account after the sales had occurred, some of it would be 
utilized for family expenses. In that instance, the money which 
did not go back into the Kidder-Peabody account clearly became a 
marital asset which was later considered by the lower court in 
the overall division of assets. 
After the parties were legally divorced, Defendant 
continued to use the bridge loan system in order to generate 
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business for his real estate brokerage. Contained in the 
Appendix of this Brief is an exhibit entitled "Peter Coats 
Post-Divorce Notes Receivable." This exhibit is a summary of 
Defendant's Exhibit 78 which was admitted by the lower court. 
Defendant's Exhibit 78 consisted of the original note as well as 
supporting documents from the Kidder-Peabody account and the 
closing of the various real estate transactions. The attached 
exhibit herein shows that approximately $148,000 was loaned, 
after the divorce was final, from the Kidder-Peabody account 
directly to third parties to facilitate the real estate 
transactions. Attached to this exhibit are the trust deed notes 
which were contained in Exhibit 78 and which show that each note 
is made payable specifically to the "Peter Coats Kidder 
Account." 
The lower court refused to eliminate these notes 
receivables as part of the marital estate and instead decided to 
discount them 20% because of their collectibility difficulties. 
(Tr. 502, Findings of Fact, pp. 16-17). As such, therefore, 
the Court utilized these ten post-divorce notes in computing the 
assets and liabilities of the parties. See Exhibit C of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 393-94. The effect 
of the inclusion of these post-divorce notes from the 
Kidder-Peabody account was to increase the marital assets 
effectively by $116,192 after the 20% discount was calculated. 
Because Defendant was given credit for having these assets, he 
was effectively penalized $58,964 for having converted the stock 
margin into notes receivable. 
This Court in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990) 
dealt with the contention that once the form of inherited 
property has been changed it loses its separate property status. 
This Court stated: 
Even though defendant's inheritance is readily 
traceable and has not been co-mingled, plaintiff 
argues that defendant's inherited funds have 
substantially changed in form—they were received as 
cash but have become stocks, bonds and real estate--
therefore they should be considered part of the 
marital estate. 
Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the Court 
stated that property which had lost its "identity 
through co-mingling or exchanges" could properly be 
considered part of the marital estate. 760 P.2d at 
308. 
We disagree with Plaintiff's reading of 
Mortensen. The thrust of Mortensen is not 
whether the mere form of property is changed, but 
whether it has lost its "identity" as separate 
property. Id. The separate character of the 
defendant's inheritance has been maintained in 
segregated accounts and portfolios and the home she 
purchased. Conversion from one investment medium to 
another does not, by itself, destroy the integrity of 
segregation. 
To accept Plaintiff's view of Mortensen would 
unreasonably discourage the prudent investment of 
inherited funds. In order to preserve the property's 
separate character, the donee or heir would be 
required to maintain the property in the same 
physical form in which it was received, be it 
securities, real estate, or cash. The law does not 
require such economic absurdity. Id. at 1169. 
(Emphasis added). 
In summary, tho decision of the lower court is inconsistent 
and cannot be sustained. Since the lower court clearly found 
the Kidder-Peabody account to be the separate property of the 
defendant it was incumbent upon the lower court to also find the 
trust deed notes specifically derived from that account and 
specifically payable back to that account to be Defendant's 
-1 a-
separate property. To have included these notes in the marital 
estate allowed the plaintiff to receive credit for one-half of 
their value. Such result cannot be sustained. This Court, 
therefore, should remand this matter and require the lower court 
to make the mathematical correction of the equities necessary to 
correct this error. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
RECOGNIZE THE FULL AMOUNT OF DEBT 
THAT DEFENDANT OWED TO HIS MOTHER 
ISABEL COATS. 
Defendant maintained that in order to develop the Brandon 
Canyon properties, it was necessary for him to borrow some 
$400,000 from his mother, Isabel Coats. Plaintiff, on the other 
hand, took the position that there was no debt owed by Defendant 
and that the entire transaction was manufactured after the 
divorce proceeding began. As an example, during the cross 
examinaton of Isabel Coats by Plaintifffs attorney, the 
following accusations were made: 
Q. (By Mr. Peterson): Isn't it true, I want to ask this 
question to you in a straight-forward fashion, isn't 
it true that this note was manufactured by Peter 
Coats after the commencement of these proceedings and 
sent to you at a date long after Kathryn Coats 
commenced these proceedings for divorce? 
A. No. 
Q. So you received then that note in its original form 
on a date sometime in early 1990? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. I'm going to ask you the question one more time. 
This note in fact was manufactured by Peter and sent 
to you long after these divorce proceedings began, 
wasn't it? 
A. No. 
Q. Didn't Peter indicate to you that as a result of the 
pretrial in front of the court, and the assertion 
that there was no evidence documenting the $400,000 
in liability to you, that you would have to have a 
note, and he sent you this note? 
A. No. (Tr. 988-90) . 
Throughout the first few days of the trial Plaintiff 
refused to recognize any debt owing to Isabel Coats. See, for 
example, Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 8, 13, and 31. On the other 
hand, even Plaintiff's accountant acknowledged that he was aware 
of Defendant's $400,000 claim concerning the note to Peter's 
mother and acknowledged that if there was such a valid note then 
Defendant should be given a liability deduction on his side of 
the accounting. (Tr. 624). In addition, Plaintiff's witness, 
David Evans, testified that he also had learned of the lien of 
Mrs. Coats for $400,000 and in fact a property search owned by 
Peter Coats revealed a $400,000 trust deed note. (Tr. 1084; 
Exhibit 57). 
Defendant's mother Isabel Coats testified that Exhibit 50 
was an original note dated January 26, 1990 which allowed her 
son to borrow up to $400,000 for his development business. She 
emphatically stated that the promissory note was a bona fide 
loan upon which she expected payment. She maintained that she 
obtained money for these loans by borrowing on her own Kidder-
Peabody margin account. (Tr. 980-87) . 
Because of the claims asserted by Plaintiff and her 
attorney at trial, the entire testimony of Isabel Coats is 
included in the appendix to this brief. Contrary to the 
assertions of the plaintiff, Mrs- Coats at no time stated the 
exact amount that was owing on the note. Instead, she testified 
as to the validity of the note and as to the method by which the 
funds were obtained from her brokerage house. There is nothing 
in the testimony to state that Exhibit 50 and its accompanying 
letters of authorization constituted the entire amount of the 
draws. (Tr. 974-1000). 
Defendant's balance sheets prepared prior to Isabel's 
testimony consistently recognized a debt of $401,000 to Isabel 
Coats together with accrued interest of $10,025. (Defendant's 
Exhibits 58 and 59). Apparently, after listening to the 
testimony of Isabel Coats, Plaintiff and her attorney decided to 
abandon the claim that no valid debt existed. Instead, 
Plaintiff now asserted in various exhibits that the actual debt 
owing was $270,000 which was the total of the written 
authorizations attached to the promissory note contained in 
Defendant's Exhibit 50. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 65, 90, 91, 97 
and 98. 
Defendant, as the debtor, testified concerning the 
existence of the note contained in Exhibit 50. Defendant 
clearly testified that he did not know the amount owing to his 
mother and relied entirely upon his accountants for that 
information. (Tr. 1056-57). 
Subsequently, Melody J. Rasmussen, a CPA assisting 
Defendant in his case, testified as to the loan between Peter 
and his mother. Plaintiff's attorney strenuously objected on 
the grounds that such testimony would contradict the direct 
testimony of Mrs. Coats and also directly contradict Exhibit 50 
containing the note and various letters written concerning the 
note. 
The Court overruled these objections and held that Ms. 
Rasmussenfs testimony was relevant and also allowed the 
introduction of Exhibit 72 into evidence. This exhibit 
contained numerous letters and accountings from Mrs. Coats 
together with an accounting of the various draws made by Peter. 
In addition, copies of checks which Peter claimed to be interest 
payments on the loans were contained in Exhibit 72. 
Ms. Rasmussen testified that as of April 30, 1992, there 
was $401,000 owing on the note and $10,025 of accrued interest 
owing. (Tr. 1379). Because of the nature of this issue, the 
entire testimony of Melody Rasmussen is also included in the 
Appendix to this Brief together with a copy of Exhibit 72. (Tr. 
1374-90). 
In closing argument Plaintiff's attorney contended that the 
testimony of Ms. Rasmussen and the accompanying exhibits were in 
direct contradiction to the testimony of Mrs. Coats who he 
claimed stated that the entire amount of the loan was $270,000 
as represented by Exhibit 50. (Tr. 1244-46). Of course, at 
this time neither Plaintiff's counsel nor the Court had the 
benefit of a transcript of Mrs. Coats' exact testimony. 
During the closing argument of Defendant's counsel, the 
Court was concerned about the accusations made by Plaintiff's 
counsel as to the contradiction of testimony. The following 
dialogue occurred: 
MR. LAREW: The liabilities for Isabel Coats I think 
counsel misrepresents- On her testimony, she didn't 
testify those letters constituted the entire record 
of her loans to Mr, Coats. These were merely 
representative. Those did represent her request to 
her brother. She never said they were all of them 
and that there weren't any others. 
THE COURT: Why didn't she testify further, then, as 
to what they were? Why didn't she give further 
testimony, then, as to—you say she didn't testify 
that was all of it: why didn't she give testimony as 
to what they all were? 
MR. LAREW: Frankly, we didn't think to ask if those 
were representative. She testified some time she 
would call on the telephone and they would be doing 
that. There was no paper transaction. 
THE COURT: And I recall she was going to leave town, 
and somebody made a request to get her in so she 
could get on out, and it seems like to me her 
testimony would be quite important to that issue. 
MR. LAREW: Frankly, Your Honor, we thought that 
sufficed. We had the promissory notes. She 
testified it was $400,000, up to $400,000. We have 
her computation, her handwritten computation showing 
that that went to—at one point it was $399,996, 
something like that, in a couple of places. 
Additionally, Your Honor, we got introduced into 
evidence Mr. Coats' payments to her of interest, and 
if those payments of interest are computed, it 
computes out to what we have said it is. That 
did—in fact he did owe her the amount of $400,000 as 
of the time when it indicates he owed that much, and 
the interest was paid. 
We've got that testimony backward and forward, 
and frankly I didn't know we would have to hammer it 
with every single one, because she didn't have the 
paper transaction for every single one. Our purpose 
was to establish that the loan had been made, and 
then with other documents establish what it had 
gotten up to. And I think we have done that, at 
least by implication. We have got secondary support 
for all of our allegations that we made regarding 
that bona fide note, bona fide obligation. 
She testified that she never gives stock for a 
loan, doesn't give cash or gifts in large amounts, it 
just came out that she borrowed against her own stock 
in order to provide cash for Mr. Coats to do this, 
gave him cash and expected to be repaid cash. 
* * * 
I think that is good evidence. There was in 
fact a note owed and interest was paid. It was 
identified as a note. It wasn't something generated 
after the fact, his interest payments go back for 
more than a year. (Tr. 1278-81). 
The lower court adopted the position of Plaintiff's 
attorney and completely discounted the testimony of the 
accountant and the accompanying documents. The Court stated: 
Isabel Coats—of course there's been a lot said 
of this. The Court has to determine what is most 
believable, what was the best testimony, and I 
question counsel on what the CPA yesterday testified 
to as far as the accounting, and the court is not 
persuaded that she—and I'm not stating—well, I 
believe she is stating it truthfully for the 
information that she had, and the Court is not making 
any accusations as far as any information being 
generated, except that the Court cannot reconcile in 
its mind if there was an obligation of $411,025 that 
when the mother was here and on the stand, that that 
would not have been brought out, especially when they 
said she had to leave and they wanted to get her on. 
So what I'm saying is I'm adopting $270,000 as the 
note due Isabel Coats. (Tr. 499-500). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is an even 
stronger statement as to the reason the lower court refused to 
recognize the increased liability. Finding No. 14(k)(2) states 
the following: 
The Court finds the liability owed to Isabel 
Coats to be $270,000. There was conflicting evidence 
presented to the Court as to the amount of liability 
owed to Isabel Coats. Isabel Coats testified to the 
Court and stated that Defendant's Exhibit D-50 showed 
all of the obligations owed by the defendant to her. 
The total amount of the notes which make up 
Defendant's Exhibit D-50 is $270,000. While the 
defendant's certified public accountant testified on 
the amount of the notes and stated that the 
outstanding balance was $411,025, that amount was 
never verified by Isabel Coats, and the Court cannot 
reconcile in its mind the difference between the 
amount testified to by the certified public 
accountant and the amount testified to by Defendant's 
mother, who is the creditor on the note. 
The Court finds that the most credible evidence 
is that of the creditor and that if she were owed 
more than $270,000, that testimony certainly would 
have been presented to the Court, That is especially 
true in the mind of the Court when the defendant 
placed Isabel Coats on the stand out of time to be 
able to get her testimony in regarding the liability 
and the amount owed to her by the defendant. 
Accordingly, the Court specifically finds that the 
preponderance of the evidence is that the outstanding 
note owed to Isabel Coats is in the amount of 
$270,000. (Findings of Fact, pp. 17-18). (Emphasis 
added). 
It is apparent that the lower court rejected Defendant's 
claim of $411,000 on the assumption that the testmony of Mrs. 
Coats directly contradicted the testimony of the accountant. As 
noted earlier, however, a review of the transcript of Mrs. 
Coats' testimony shows no such contradiction. Mrs. Coats never 
stated the amount that was owing to her and never stated that all 
of the letters attached to the promissory note contained in 
Exhibit 50 were the entire sum due and owing to her by her son. 
It is clear from reading the transcript that Mrs. Coats did not 
state any figure whatsoever except as to the $400,000 note 
itself. Thus, the specific finding by the lower court of the 
contradiction in testimony is clearly erroneous. 
In addition, Defendant as the debtor was entitled to 
present evidence as to what he claimed was owing to his mother. 
Independent of her testimony he also relied upon the accountants 
to verify his claim. For this reason, therefore, the testimony 
of Ms. Rasmussen not only supplemented that of Isabel Coats as 
the creditor but also constituted the testimony of Defendant as 
the debtor. 
Again, this issue is similar to the previous one. The 
lower court obviously had a great deal of discretion in deciding 
whether to believe that a valid debt existed or did not exist. 
Had the Court ruled against such a debt it is unlikely that this 
Court would ever disturb the lower court's discretionary 
decision based upon the conflicting testimony of the witnesses. 
However, once the lower court made a decision as to which way it 
would proceed, it was incumbent upon the Court to find the 
correct amount owing under the Isabel Coats note. The Court 
incorrectly assumed that there was conflicting testimony 
presented in the case and that the Court had to decide which 
version of the amount it was to believe. It is clear, however, 
that no such contradiction existed and the Court erred in 
concluding that it was required to make such a decision. 
In reality, Defendant's evidence is consistent that a note 
was executed by Defendant to his mother for up to $400,000, that 
various draws were made by his mother from her Kidder-Peabody 
account throughout the two year period in order to finance 
Defendant's building projects, and that the interest payments 
made by the defendant as evidenced by checks in the record are 
completely consistent with the amounts claimed to be owing both 
by the accountant and by the letters of Defendant's mother 
contained in Exhibit 72. 
For these reasons, therefore, the Court erred in awarding 
only a $270,000 debt to the defendant and this Court should 
remand for correction to the proper amount in order to equalize 
the accounting of the marital estate. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ARBITRARILY 
CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH A MARITAL ASSET 
VALUE OF $57,300 FOR THE BRANDON CANYON 
DEVELOPMENT WHEN SUCH FINDING WAS NOT 
BASED UPON ANY EVIDENCE. 
It is undisputed that during the course of the marriage 
Defendant undertook a real estate development project known as 
Brandon Canyon. This project came about after defendant had 
been persuaded to purchase land in this subdivision area for the 
purpose of resale and development. Because of the terrain and 
other economic factors, he was unable to sell several of these 
construction lots. In conjunction with others, therefore, he 
began a project where he would finance and sell the completed 
houses once they had been constructed. (Tr. 1055-58). 
As with almost every asset and liability at issue in this 
divorce action, the parties had diverse views as to the success 
or failure of the Brandon Canyon development. Plaintiff 
attempted to prove through various expert witnesses that the 
Brandon Canyon property development was a successful financial 
venture and severely disagreed with the costs of development 
claimed by Defendant. On the other hand, Defendant and his 
witnesses maintained that because of extreme difficulty in the 
terrain of the development, costs were much higher than 
anticipated and that very little profit would ever be made. 
Defendant principally obtained financing for the Brandon 
Canyon project from his mother, Isabel Coats, in an amount that 
he claimed to be approximately $400,000 but which Plaintiff 
claimed to be $270,000. This initial money funded the project 
to the completion of some houses but was insufficient to 
complete others. It was therefore necessary to obtain 
additional money from other sources or to wait until the sale of 
some of the properties before others could be completed. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 computed the Brandon Canyon assets 
to be approximately $560,000 based upon the projected sales 
price of lots 15, 16 and 17 together with a trust deed note on 
lot 28 and the value of an undeveloped lot, no. 4. As to the 
liability aspect of the Brandon Canyon development, Plaintiff 
recognized only $270,000 as the Isabel Coats promissory note 
thereby showing an assert over liability value of $290,000. 
Defendant strongly contested this evaluation. He argued 
that the amount shown as assets in Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 
represented completed houses. In fact, however, the houses were 
not complete and would require additional funding before they 
could in fact be sold for the prices projected by the plaintiff. 
For this reason, Defendant attempted to value the properties as 
of April 30, 1992 so that both the asset value and the liability 
value could be computed at the same time. 
Defendant offered Exhibit 99 which was entitled "Brandon 
Canyon Detail April 30, 1992." This exhibit showed that the 
combined asset value of Lots 4, 15, 16, 17, 23, and 28 was 
$319,117 based upon the actual money that had been expended as 
to each lot. 
Shortly before trial the house on Lot 16 was sold for 
$171,900. Exhibit 99 valued lot 16 at $105,517 as of April 30, 
1992. As of that date, however, the house was certainly not in 
a sellable condition and it required Defendant to expend an 
additional amount of money during the next five-week period in 
order to complete and finish the home. Neither the plaintiff 
(Tr. 1574, 1583) nor the defendant (Tr. 1595-97) were aware of 
what the actual construction costs were to complete the Lot 16 
house. 
Thus, at the close of the case the positions of the parties 
were as follows: Plaintiff maintained that the asset value of 
Brandon Canyon was the projected sale of all the lots totaling 
$591,000 with a recognized liability to Isabel Coats of 
$270,000. Plaintiff acknowledged that all the the houses were 
not in fact sold or complete and that additional construction 
costs of an unknown amount would be required before sale could 
be completed. 
Defendant, on the other hand, evaluated the asset of 
Brandon Canyon at $319,000 as of April 30, 1992 with a 
recognized liability of $410,000 owing to Isabel Coats. Since 
Lot 16 was already evaluated at that date, Defendant took the 
position that any subsequent sale was immaterial since it would 
require a concurrent adjustment of liabilities as well. 
The Court adopted the value of Brandon Canyon proposed by 
the defendant but, in addition, added an additional $57,000 of 
value based upon the sale of Lot 16. The Court stated in the 
bench ruling: 
Brandon Canyon has been somewhat of a headache 
to the Court. I guess I have to indicate to you that 
I'm still not thoroughly convinced as to what is 
taking place as far as Brandon Canyon assets are 
concerned. I'm going to talk for a few minutes on 
this. 
The Court, from the exhibits and testimony, was 
somewhat persuaded that $319,117 is probably the 
value of Brandon Canyon, except for the fact of the 
defendant taking the stand and testifying as to the 
value of certain lots, and particularly saying that 
Lot 16 has already been sold for $171,900. 
If Brandon Canyon has a value of $319,000 and as 
they develop more and finish it and put more money 
into it, and sell homes, they would start to get 
money out of it. And that's fine. The Court would 
take that. 
But why does Lot 16, which has been sold, really 
now is out of Brandon Canyon, and I have no basis for 
taking that lot out and subtracting a value from the 
$319,000. 
So what I'm saying is that the evidence is still 
conflicting to this Court as far as what is taking 
place. I shouldn't say—well, "taking place" or what 
the value of Brandon Canyon really is. 
And I don't know that I can sit here and hear 
testimony from the defendant and from the accountants 
on Brandon Canyon and from each party that comes and 
still come back with the amounts which they had. 
So the Court is going to do this; and I'll 
admit this is an arbitrary situation. The Court is 
going to place a value on Brandon Canyon of $319,117 
plus one-third of $171,900 or the value that Lot 16 
sold for. And that's the way the Court is going to 
treat that in there. (Tr. 498-99). (Emphasis 
added). See also Finding of Fact 14(i)(2). 
The Court clearly acknowledged that the decision to add the 
additional $57,000 was arbitrary. Again, Defendant recognizes 
that this case provided many difficult decisions in valuation of 
assets and does not blame the court for attempting to reach a 
fair valuation. However, there is simply no evidentiary support 
for the method utilized by the lower court and therefore 
Defendant cannot be legally charged with an additional $57,000 
in marital assets based upon the existing record. 
As noted earlier, Defendant recognized that the value of 
Lot 16 was $105,517- This amount was computed in the total 
$319,000 figure used by the Court. It is undisputed that the 
property was in fact sold for $172,000. The decision of the 
Court, however, fails to recognize the unknown liabilities 
incurred in order to complete Lot 16. There is simply no 
evidence in the record as to what additional money was required 
in order to bring a property which had $105,000 in costs 
invested in it as of April 30, 1992 to a market value of 
$172,000 in June of 1992. 
The present decision concludes that Defendant essentially 
made $57,000 from the sale of Lot 16. This "profit" was then 
utilized by the Court as a marital asset in computing what 
equities existed between the parties. As a practical matter, 
therefore, Plaintiff received almost $30,000 in an adjusted 
judgment because of this arbitrary one-third calculation 
utilized the Court. 
There are two options available to remedy this situation. 
The first is to simply vacate the $57,000 award of the lower 
court and valuate the properties as of April 30, 1992 as was 
done by the defendant. Under this theory the subsequent sale is 
irrelevant as is any subsequent construction costs of 
development. 
The second option is to remand this matter to the lower 
court so that Defendant may produce evidence as to the liability 
which was incurred in order to sell this house at the $172,000 
purchase price. If for example, Defendant shows an additional 
$55,000 was expended in order to make the house marketable, then 
Plaintiff would be entitled to an asset value of $12,000 which 
would be the difference between the sales price and the actual 
cost of construction- Defendant would have no objection to 
including any profit as an asset as long as he has had the 
opportunity to produce evidence of actual cost liabilities to 
offset the sales price that was received as the asset. 
Under either option, however, this Court should exercise 
its appellate authority and require an adjustment be made to 
this clearly erroneous calculation made by the lower court, 
POINT IV 
ALTHOUGH THE COURT ORDERED DEFENDANT 
TO BE GIVEN A CREDIT OF $4,300 FOR 
PLAINTIFF'S SALE OF THE FAMILY BOAT, 
NO SUCH CREDIT WAS EVER GIVEN IN THE 
ACTUAL ACCOUNTING. 
During the course of the marriage, the parties purchased a 
boat which they used for recreational purposes. After the 
separation Plaintiff took possession of the boat and ultimately 
sold it to meet family needs. The Court found that the 
plaintiff received $4,300 from the sale of the boat and also 
found this to be the best value to be attributed to it, (Tr. 
496-97) . 
The Court gave the parties two options as to how to handle 
this credit. Either Plaintiff could be charged with a liability 
of $4; 300 as to the marital accounting or, Defendant could 
subtract $4,300 from the amount that he was obligated to pay 
Plaintiff in order to avoid contempt of court. (Tr. 503-05). 
In fact, however, Defendant paid the full amount of support 
arrearage with no deduction for the boat but did not receive any 
credit for the boat in the marital accounting, (See Schedule C 
to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). For this reason, 
therefore, an adjustment should be made in the equities now 
owing between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
This was a complex divorce case requiring tremendous effort 
on the part of all involved* The lower court did a commendable 
job in sorting out the various claims and disputes. The sheer 
volume of problems being confronted may have allowed these few 
to slip through the crack. 
It is apparent that once the court determined that the 
Kidder account was the separate property of Defendant, any use 
of those funds after the divorce was final could not be deemed a 
marital asset no matter what form the asset became. This 
wrongful inclusion requires appellate correction. 
The failure to recognize the full amount of the Isabel 
Coats note resulted from a perceived conflict in testimony. 
With the present advantage of a trial transcript, it can be 
readily seen that no conflict existed and that the preponderance 
of evidence showed an obligation of $410,000. This error too 
requires correction. 
The arbitrary award of $57,000 to Plaintiff as a result of 
the Lot 16 sale cannot be sustained. While Defendant 
understands the frustration of the Court in dealing with Brandon 
Canyon, there must nevertheless be some rationale in making 
awards of assets. Here, there was no logical reason to 
arbitrarily take 1/3 of the sales price and award it to 
Plaintiff- A correction or remand is therefore required. 
The $4,300 error as to the boat is minor, but still 
requires an adjustment in order to meet the order of the Court, 
Defendant asks this Court to grant the relief requested. 
DATED this 12th day of June, 1993. 
Craig S(- JCook 
Attorney for Defendant 
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